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by
Michael G. Watts
Fall 2018

Abstract
This research project examines export control policy in the United States, mainly
the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) as it relates to research practices in higher education. The goal of this
project is to raise awareness of the current export control regulations, examine the
importance of academic freedom in higher education, illustrate Eastern Washington
University’s (EWU) growing research potential, and offer guidance for if or when EWU
engages in export control related practices. In support of these goals, EWU’s 2018-2023
strategic plan, international student population, strength of STEM programming, the
faculty values statement, and current export control policy were reviewed. The research
concludes with the following recommendations for EWU: that the institution (1)
strengthen its already-in-place reactionary stance (its current export control policy) for
complying with current export control regulations, and (2) implement safeguards to
protect and promote academic freedom, and question the ethicality of policies that
provide access to knowledge for some groups of people while restricting that access to
others.
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Chapter One
Introduction
In 2012, a former professor of electrical engineering at the University of
Tennessee, Dr. John Roth, began his sentence of four years in prison for convictions of
conspiracy and 15 counts of exporting defense articles and services without a proper U.S.
export license. Roth had originally received a United States Air Force contract to develop
plasma actuators for military drones. During his tenure, he also allowed this controlled
data to be accessed by two engineering graduate students from China and Iran. Under the
1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) however, the export of defense-related technical
data to a foreign national or foreign nation without a license is illegal. This case was the
first of its kind in prosecuting a university professor for the transfer of controlled defense
technical data, knowledge, and research to foreign students (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2012).
The conviction of Dr. Roth is an important inflection point for academics and
research institutions around the world. It illustrates not only the severity of violating
United States export control laws—in this case the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) of the AECA—but it also raises ethical and moral considerations
relative to academic freedom in higher education. The military, law enforcement, and
intelligence communities emphasize that export control laws advance United States
foreign policy, achieve national security objectives, and prevent academic espionage,
which to some extent they do. However, these policies have the potential to erode the
concept of academic freedom for all and questions the overall ethicality of restricting
knowledge to some groups of people and not others. With these conflicting views in
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mind, the goal of this research project is to (1) raise awareness of export regulations in a
general sense and in academia, (2) examine the importance of academic freedom in
higher education, and (3) illustrate Eastern Washington University’s (EWU) growing
research potential and offer suggestions and the necessary considerations of engaging in
export control related practices.
In order to raise awareness and understanding of current export control
regulations, the second chapter of this project provides a policy cycle examination of
export control and the implementing regulations in the United States. This policy cycle
examination includes an analysis on issue emergence, agenda setting, alternative
selection, enactment, implementation, and evaluation. The evaluation section covers a
description on the importance and limitations of export regulation from a national
security and foreign policy lens and is followed by an examination of the current
controversies between export control and the ethics of academic freedom. Chapter Five
illustrates EWU’s growing research potential and the need for export control policy
review. This section reviews the institution’s continued successful growth in STEM
programming, international student and faculty participation, the faculty values
statement, the current strategic plan, and existing export control policy. Finally, the last
chapter provides suggestions and considerations for Eastern Washington University to
begin the communicative process of engaging in export control practices. This paper is
organized by the following chapters:
Chapter One: Introduction
Methodologies
Export Control and Definition of Terms

3

Chapter Two: Policy Examination of Export Control Laws
Issue Emergence and Agenda Setting
Alternative Selection, Enactment, Implementation, and Evaluation
Chapter Three: The Importance and Limitations of Export Control
Chapter Four: Academic Freedom in U.S. Higher Education
Academic Research under Export Control
Chapter Five: EWU’s Research Potential and Export Control Review
Chapter Six: Recommendations, Considerations, and Conclusion

Apart from providing export control awareness and a discussion on the ethical
considerations of engaging in these practices, what is the larger significance of this
project? What is the answer to the “So what?” question? From a foreign policy
perspective, export control and the implementing regulations can be justified through
national security objectives. But that is just one side. Globalization—the phenomenon
driven by the technological movement of global ideas, cultures, languages, and goods—is
a major influence as well. The philosophical stance behind this research assumes that
exposure to diverse ideas, cultures, and people is fundamental to intellectual progress.
Further, it assumes that academic freedom is the essential bedrock upon which
knowledge-generating U.S. colleges and universities are built. But implementing more
protectionist and nationalistic policies could threaten these principles. This project aims
to discuss the considerations of engaging in export controlled related practices at Eastern
Washington University; it also questions the ethicality of protectionist and nationalistic
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policies that ultimately provide access to knowledge for some groups of people while
restricting that access to others.
The interest for this research project is built on my coursework from the EWU
Master of Science in Communications (MSC) and the Master of Public Administration
(MPA) programs, as well as my first-hand, ethnographic experience working in the
summer and fall of 2018 for the United States Department of State, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (DDTC) and the Bureau
of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA). DDTC is the very agency that has been
delegated authority from Congress to interpret and enforce the ITAR which implements
parts of U.S. export control law. The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs is
responsible for fostering understanding between the people of the United States and the
people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchanges. During my
tenure at the State Department, both agencies dealt with the growing tensions between
academic freedom and United States national security and foreign policy objectives. My
educational background and my time spent interning in Washington D.C. combined to
serve as the driving factors in the design and pursuit of this culminating research project.

Methodologies
For this research project, a primary computerized literature search was conducted
to investigate and collect the most relevant peer-reviewed articles and books using
Google Scholar and databases like EBSCOhost: Academic Search Complete. The
databases searched within EBSCOhost included Communication & Mass Media
Complete, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Education Research
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Complete, Military & Government Collection, Newspaper Search Complete, Primary
Search, and PsycINFO. Published reports from government agencies and those that
appeared in peer-reviewed journals and books were collected as the primary sources of
data. Search items included ITAR and academic freedom, ethics and knowledge, export
control and history, and export control and research. Primary news sources were also
used to relate current and past events and practices to export control laws. Websites from
Eastern Washington University and surrounding institutions were also used to examine
EWU’s accomplishments in higher education, strategic plan, and current export control
policy. This literature search was intended to include the most relevant research on the
identified topics and included the most recent research ranging from the early 1900s (the
starting point of export control laws) to 2018. The literature searches were conducted in
the fall of 2018.

Export Control and ITAR: Definition of Terms
Before conducting a policy cycles examination of export control and the
governing laws, a brief definition of U.S. export terminology must be provided. Export
control in the United States is complicated with many underlying policies, pieces of
legislation, and government agencies that interpret and enforce the regulations. This
project does not aim to go in depth on the specifics of each law, the regulations, and their
evolution. Rather, it is designed to take a thirty-thousand-foot view of United States
export control policy and relate it to the controversies surrounding academic freedom in
higher education. This project ideally will serve to contextualize and inform early

6

discussions should Eastern Washington University engage in export control related
practices. The definitions of important terms and concepts are listed below.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA): This act authorizes the President to
control the commercial export of defense articles and defense services. “The President
exercises this control through the Office of Munitions Control of the U.S. State
Department. The Department of State designates those items which it considers to be
defense articles and defense services, and therefore subject to export control, in the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The items designated as defense
articles and services in the ITAR comprise the U.S. Munitions List (USML) (Monahan,
1983, p. 175). Note: technical data, research, and knowledge are included in the USML.

The Export Administration Act of 1979: Similar to the 1976 AECA, this act provides
the President with authority to implement export controls on non-military goods,
services, and technical data for reasons of national security and foreign policy objectives.
This act evolved from the Export Control Act of 1949 (Monahan, 1983, p. 184).

Export Administration Regulations (EAR): The EAR is a set of rules under the
Department of Commerce that governs the exportation of dual-use technologies. Under
this, dual-use exports involve technology that has both commercial and military or
proliferation applications. To constitute an export under the EAR, an actual shipment or
transmission of items [including technology or software subject to the EAR] out of the
United States must occur. The EAR contains a list of items called the Commerce Control
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List (CCL) for which licenses are required for exports or re-exports to certain countries
(as cited in Templin, 2009, p. 552).

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): The ITAR is a set of regulations
that governs exports of defense related articles and services. Under the ITAR, sending or
taking a defense article or service out of the United States in any manner constitutes
exporting. This includes disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring
technical data to a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad. Items and
technology controlled by the ITAR are contained in United States Munitions List
(USML), which the Office of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State,
maintains (as cited in Templin, 2009, pp. 553-554).

Technical Data under the ITAR: Technical data falls under three categories. “First,
any unclassified information that can be used, or be adopted for use, in the design,
production, manufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, development,
operation, maintenance, or reconstruction of arms, ammunition, and implements of war
on the USML. Second, any technology which advances the state-of-the-art or establishes
a new art in an area of significant military applicability in the United States. And third,
[any data that] includes classified information” (Monahan, 1983, p. 176).
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Chapter Two
Policy Cycle Examination of Export Control Laws
For this section, I examined the implementation of export control laws using the
stages model of the policy process described by political scientist Thomas Birkland, in
his 2016 book An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of
Public Policy Making. The stages of analysis include: Issue Emergence, Agenda Setting,
Alternative Selection, Enactment, Implementation, and Evaluation. This model divides
the policy process into a series of stages from a notional starting point (the issue or
problem to address), to the end point, or the evaluation of how successful the policy has
been.
U.S. export law is complicated, and this project only scratches the surface of the
underlying policies and their evolution. In general, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976
and the Export Administration Act of 1979 both grant authority to the President to control
U.S. exports. These two Acts developed over time within the context of—and under the
influence of—multiple domestic and foreign events. They are the most important pieces
of legislation affecting both the control of exported defense goods and services and the
control of technical data and sensitive research.
Finally, there are currently two main sets of regulations within the legislation that
govern United States export law: (1) The Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
administered under the Department of Commerce, and (2) the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) under the Department of State. For the scope of this research
project, I examined the ITAR and some parts of the EAR regarding research in higher
education.
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Issue Emergence and Agenda Setting
From the height of the cold war with the former Soviet Union, to current tensions
with China, it’s clear that the United States government will confront economic, military,
political, and/or strategic aggression if any aspect of U.S. supremacy is threatened.
Recently, Vice President Mike Pence condemned China for its alleged hacking and
espionage attempts within the United States, its theft of U.S. technological secrets, and
unfair trade practices (Tharoor, 2018). Within the United States Government, there
currently exists a heightened sense of insecurity relative to valuable U.S. research and
technology illegally exported to the labs of foreign adversaries. Take for instance the
story of Chinese graduate student Ruopeng Liu. According to NBC News (2018), in 2006,
Liu enrolled at Duke University and studied under Dr. David Smith, a leading researcher
in technology and metamaterials. Dr. Smith is known for designing and creating a socalled “invisibility cloak.” This research and development attracted the attention and the
investment of millions of dollars from the U.S. military in hopes that one day this
material could be used to protect U.S. troops. However, years later, Dr. Smith was
surprised to see an exact copy of his technology built in China. Liu now has a PhD from
Duke and a tech company valued at six billion dollars. This case was just one of many
examples of an increase in academic espionage (McFadden, C., Nadi, A., & McGee, C.,
2018).
Although the aggressive rhetoric from Vice President Pence and the intelligence
community which characterizes other nations as an enemy or rival is belligerent and
crass, it isn’t a new phenomenon. During the cold war, tensions of uncertainty and fear of
Russian control resonated with many Americans, politicians, and lawmakers. Joseph
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McCarthy, a Republican senator from Wisconsin, gained national notoriety for his smear
tactics against Communists and Soviet nationals. This eventually led to the concept of
“McCarthyism,” or the practice of making accusations of treason without proper
evidence. McCarthy demonstrated this unethical practice during a speech at the Women’s
Republican Club in West Virginia in 1950:
While I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who
have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring,
I have here in my hand a list of 205 (Joseph McCarthy, as cited in Lindsay, 2014).

Here, McCarthy claimed to have a solid list of 205 insider threats (potential spies)
within the United States Department of State. However, the senator did not provide
evidence in this statement to back up his claims. Many of these accusations were later
defined as baseless accusation, essentially just words.
Throughout his career, McCarthy and these tactics fueled fears of Communism
throughout the United States, including U.S. legislators, members of Congress, and the
general public. However, McCarthy’s distress over Communism did not originate with
him. U.S. intelligence officials had already developed a rigid mindset about Soviet
influence. George Kennan, a U.S. diplomat from 1926 – 1953 highlighted this in a 1946
formal cable to the U.S. Department of State from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Being a
lot more diplomatic and less provocative with his language than either McCarthy or
Pence, Kennan wrote:
In summary, we have here [in the Soviet Union] a political force committed
fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus
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vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our
society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political
force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s
greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory and is
borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism (George
Kennan, as cited in Lindsay, 2014).
Comparing the rhetoric of today to examples of decades ago reveals that they both
ultimately create(ed) a separation of “us” and “them.” They paint the other as the enemy
of the American people whose purpose is to spy, steal, and undermine the American way
of life. While the accuracy of their claims is debatable, it’s clear that this framing
continues to exist as a powerful tool that influences policy debates. Today, this framing
concerns mainly China. Back then, it was Russia, and before that, Germany and Japan.
This fear of “the other” and losing standing in the “great world power” competition,
requires a look through the historical and national security lens at the time.
Issue emergence and Agenda setting is an important part of the policy life cycle.
Issue emergence identifies problems that require government attention and resources,
even as it defines the nature of the problem or issue at hand. Agenda setting is defined by
Birkland (2016) as the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose
public and elite attention. Groups must promote their issues’ in the limited agenda space
and especially when a crisis makes their issue more likely to gain attention (p. 200). That
latter part of this definition—the crisis—is the key to understanding not only how early
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U.S. export laws were imposed, but how tougher national security measures were
adopted post-Cold War and after the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks.
During the era of the Cold War, there was reason to believe that powerful,
communist states could use knowledge and science for political and military gains against
the United States. The U.S. had seen unimaginable destruction and carnage in World War
II by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan and was fearful that the Soviet Union could
potentially do the same. Surprisingly, World War II and the Cold War were not the
starting events in efforts to regulate U.S exports and control technical data. According to
Elise Keppler (2001), the associate director of the International Justice Program at
Human Rights Watch, export controls have been implemented throughout U.S. history to
advance economic, national security, and foreign policy interests. It was not until after
World War II, that such controls were imposed on an ongoing basis, instead of just for
limited periods during wartime (p. 389). During the 1930s, the president was originally
authorized through neutrality acts to control the export of arms to any nation during a
time of war. Yet due to nature of these acts and their provisions, the executive branch was
inefficient in responding to changes in political and military climates. Throughout the
years and with the great impact of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, these
acts were eventually revised and amended to what we follow today as the 1976 Arms
Export Control Act. Patrick J. Monahan (1983), now judge of the Superior Court of
Justice in Toronto, Ontario, described the three broad policy aims that were created
through this act:
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 replaced the Mutual Security Act of
1954…This act advances three broadly-worded policy objectives. (1) encourage

13

regional arms control and disarmament agreements and to discourage arms races;
(2) facilitate the common defense by entering into international arrangements with
friendly countries; and (3) to encourage the world community to reduce
international trade in weapons (p.174).
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 was just one way the United States adapted
some of its legislation to control the export of defense goods and services. World War II
and its aftermath significantly influenced how legislators promoted issues of national
security and their solutions. In addition, the tightening democracy-communism tension
derived from the Cold War set the stage for the implementation of new and ongoing
export control laws on defense goods, services, and technology. It transformed the issue
of national security from a conflict-centered acute focus to an ongoing issue in a chronic
state of crisis. From now on, the distinct separation of times of peace and war would
forever be blurred. Maintaining and achieving “national security” would become an
endless “battle.”
Apart from the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, The Export Administration Act
of 1979 also provided the President with authority to control non-military exports:
The Export Control Act of 1949 was the first legislation designed specifically to
regulate non-military exports. The 1949 Act was primarily an outgrowth of
American concern over Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. This concern
prompted the U.S. government to take measures to protect national security.
Specifically, the U.S. government used this concern for national security as its
basis for licensing controls on exports to the Soviet Union and the countries of
Eastern Europe. The national security rationale became more compelling as the
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"Cold War" consciousness took hold of Congress. American involvement in the
Korean conflict provided additional justification for restricting U.S. exports to
Communist nations. National security required closer scrutiny of exports to North
Korea's communist allies and led to a complete embargo on exports to North
Korea and the People's Republic of China. In general, the United States prohibited
any exports which would assist the Communist nations militarily or economically
(Monahan, 1983, p. 185).
The range of export control established by the Export Control Act of 1949 was
broad due to the political relationship between the United States and the Communist
world at the time. However, in the 1960s and the progressive era, the rationale for strict
export control lost traction. Congress implemented the Export Administration Act (EAA)
of 1969 for more liberal export control. This act narrowed the broad mandated controls to
only strict control of exported goods to communist states with potential strategic value
(Monahan, 1983, pp. 185-186).
These more liberal policy regulations would last only until the early to mid-1970s.
In 1973, the United States experienced the OPEC oil embargo which severely restricted
U.S. access to foreign supplies. Congress amended the 1969 EAA as a way to achieve
U.S. economic goals by using export controls to remove foreign embargos. Export
control once again expanded itself in scope from being mainly used for national security
during times of conflict, to the current state of achieving any foreign policy objective
whether for reasons of security, economic, political, or social value. In 1977, Congress
amended the EAA once more to the following:
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[This] amendment authorized the President to use export controls “to encourage
other countries to make immediate steps to prevent the use of their territories or
resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to international terrorists. [In
addition], the emergence of the United States as a proponent of human rights
widened the scope of foreign policy export controls. In 1976, Congress declared
that a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States was "to promote the
increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.”
This declaration explicitly expanded the purposes for which the United States
could implement foreign policy controls (Monahan, 1983, pp. 186-187).
Both the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Export Administration Act of
1979 are important for understanding the development of United States export control.
Both contain broad and vague language that emphasize the need for stronger national
security measures with a wider scope of foreign policy influence. Congress would also
later make major innovations in these acts by focusing national security controls on
technology and data rather than only on tangible goods (Monahan, 1983, p. 187).
The impact of World War II and the development of the Cold War ultimately
created the versions of the export control legislation we follow today, the Arms Export
Control Act and the Export Administration Act. Both acts restrict the flow of defense
related articles, services, and technology with the sole mission of protecting national
security and furthering U.S. foreign policy. However, the export control system has
evolved at a much slower pace than the international arena it operates in. Samuel W.
Evans, University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma scholar, and Walter D. Valdivia, a
senior policy editor for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (2012),
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describe two key events that ultimately shifted the political order from a bipolar balance
of powers during the cold war, to a multi-polar world beyond the sovereign state: the end
of the Cold War itself, and the crisis that was the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks (p.
177). Since then, export controls and related regulations have expanded. Both private
enterprise and the academic community have long criticized U.S export laws stating that
it interferes with international communication and undermines essential academic values
(Monahan, 1983, p. 196). But what were the alternatives to these measures for protecting
national security and advancing U.S. foreign policy? And how has the implementation of
these policies impacted academic freedom? This next section attempts to answer these
important questions.

Alternative Selection, Enactment, Implementation, and Evaluation
Alternative selection is a critical step in the public policy cycle and in the
decision-making process itself. Rutgers University public policy scholars Frank Fischer,
Gerald Miller, and Mara Sydney (2007) explain in their book Handbook of Public Policy
Analysis, that “any decision-making should be based on a comprehensive analysis of
problems and goals, followed by an inclusive collection and analysis of information and a
search for the best alternative to achieve these goals” (p. 44). As we can see from the
previous examination of issue emergence and agenda setting, the concept of export
control has developed through the years within the context of political and military
tension between global powers. Because it has evolved and expanded into an on-going
tool used for foreign policy and maintaining national security, questions arise about the
appropriateness of measures for export control in the current climate.
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According to export control scholars Evans and Valdivia (2012), “when a state
wishes to prevent knowledge, information, or goods from falling into an enemy’s hands,
it has several mechanisms at its disposal. The most stringent of these are embargos,
which cut off all flow of the item to a particular entity. Less stringent mechanisms
include classifying the item (e.g. Secret, Top Secret) or requiring government approval
through a system of export controls and/or visas before a transfer takes place” (p. 174). In
terms of temporary controls, for example during times of war and crises, embargos made
the most sense as they are provisional bans on certain commodities or to specific
countries. The classification system and export controls however were more permanent
and were used to achieve longer term foreign policy objectives and goals. The decision to
use export controls as temporary mechanism in controlling the movement of goods,
information, and technology may have made sense during severe crises, such as after the
2001 September 11 attacks when national security objectives became top priority. But
taking these policy objectives too far in one direction also has its own consequences,
including those described by Robert O’Neil, First Amendment law scholar from the
University of Virginia in 2003:
Historically, the government’s domestic arsenal in times of crisis has included
three weapons: secrecy, surveillance, and suppression. The need to maintain the
secrecy of certain critical military information is indisputable, as is the imperative
to gather information about an enemy’s actions and plans…Confined within
proper bounds, such measures need not pose a threat to civil liberties in general or
to academic freedom in particular. But we have learned from experience that in
the passion of war, and in the hands of those who may be properly zealous for its
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successful prosecution, the boundaries can blur. Information the body politic
vitally needs to maintain oversight of public affairs has been made secret, and
classification has sometimes been imposed solely to save the classifying entity
from accountability and embarrassment. Surveillance has been extended to lawful
activity. Political dissent has been suppressed and, at points, such suppression has
threatened to chill the robustness of debate upon which democracy depends (p. 3).

Because these methods originated for temporary use during a time of crisis but
have evolved into a lasting policy strategy, greater, more ethical concerns have arisen,
especially when the control of knowledge and information is involved. The enactment
and implementation of long-term export control legislation has been criticized and
debated for these very reasons.
After alternative selection, enactment is the fourth stage described by Birkland in
the stages model of the policy cycles. Simply put, enactment is the act of putting a
decision, such as legislation or regulation, into effect (p. 202). Export controls in the
United States in the last five decades have broadened in scope from regulating tangible
goods for economic and some national security concerns, to now controlling knowledge
and information for achieving national security and foreign policy objectives. As
explained in the introduction, since this research project is only looking at a snapshot of
export control policy in relation to academic freedom in the United States, only the
enactment of the related ITAR regulations under the AECA and some parts of the EAR
regulations were examined.
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The ITAR is regulated and interpreted under the U.S. Department of State,
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). Under these regulations, any person
engaged in the business of manufacturing, brokering, or exporting of items on the United
States Munitions List (USML) must register with DDTC. A license request must also be
submitted whenever there are intentions to commercially export defense articles, services,
or technical data. In addition, authorization from DDTC is required when releasing
technical data to a foreign person in or outside of the United States. Finally, DDTC has
the authority to “deny, revoke, suspend, or amend the export license without prior notice
whenever the department believes such action would further ‘world peace’, the security
of the United States, or the foreign policy of the United States” (Monahan, 1983, p. 183).
The enactment of the ITAR, specifically the regulation requiring authorization of
releasing technical data to a foreign person in or outside of the United States, has been
criticized by the academic and business communities. With the increase in
globalization—as described in the introduction—and a slow societal shift to globalism—
the ideology that prioritizes global citizenship over national interests, collaboration and
cooperating with foreign nationals and students has become rather common place in
higher education and within business. This tension created through the current aims of
export control and the common practices experienced in today’s higher education and
business worlds has made for evaluation of export control policy highly complicated and
controversial.
Evaluation, the final stage of the public policy cycle, is the process of
investigating whether and to what extent a certain program or policy has its desired effect
(Birkland, p. 60). Since the implementation of export control regulations, specifically the
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ITAR under the AECA, these governing laws have received a lot of debate and criticism
throughout the years. Critics claim they are either too restrictive or not restrictive enough.
The evaluation stage is incorporated into this project’s main examination of academic
freedom in the context of export control. In this study, an exploration into the importance
of export control and the regulations in furthering national security and foreign policy
will precede the academic freedom discussion. It’s clear though, these regulations still
have their limitations and challenges.
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Chapter Three
The Importance and Limitations of Export Control
As mentioned before, in the post-Cold War and post-911 world, the political order
has shifted from a bipolar balance of powers to a multi-polar world beyond the sovereign
state. In this new reality, contemporary conflicts are often fought by nonstate actors. And
yet, the export control system itself, or rather the very fundamental concept of what
export controls should accomplish, has not evolved to operate effectively in the present
international, political, economic, and social system. “Current conflicts tend to be civil
wars fought within one state resulting from tensions between various ethnic, political,
religious, and cultural groups in that country” (Keppler, 2001, p. 385).
The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda is a perfect, if tragic, example. Here, the
extremists in Rwanda’s ruling regime killed more than 500,000 Tutsis and Hutus.
Although governmental legislation and regulation can’t change the demented minds of
the extremist groups responsible for the slaughter, it could and should have done more to
prevent—or at least mitigate—these catastrophes. Keppler (2001) described that between
1990 and 1994, more than $26.9 million in small arms and light weapons were sold to the
Rwandan government by governments and private brokers. And despite arms export
controls that prohibit transfers to certain destinations, few, if any, of the actors involved
are held accountable for their activities (p. 381-382). It is at this point that we should
question whether we are learning from these humanitarian crises and terrorists’ acts,
adapting our policies and regulations as they are intended? Fast forward to 2012. Even
when there is a serious indictment of export control violations, specifically the ITAR and
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AECA, and deaths mounting, limitations of prosecution, inadequate penalties, and
incomplete investigations have and do occur.
On September 12, 2012, an Islamic militant group attacked two U.S. government
facilities overseas: the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi and a nearby annex building. These
attacks ultimately killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens, three other
Americans, and wounded many others. The Benghazi case itself is extremely complicated
by accusations of political coverups, wrongdoings, and illegal activity. However, the
involvement of Marc Turi, an American arms dealer of Turi Defense Group LLC, cannot
be contested. According to Politico (2016), Mr. Turi cooperated with the State
Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and based on a compliance review,
DDTC alleged that Mr. Turi engaged in brokering activities for the proposed transfer of
defense articles to Libya, despite the original license denial. Turi was indicted on four
felony counts: two of arms dealing in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and two
of lying to the State Department in official applications. The charges accused Turi of
claiming that the weapons involved were destined for Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates, when the arms were actually intended to reach Libya (Vogel & Gerstein). His
only punishment was to pay a $200,000 civil penalty and refrain from U.S.-regulated
arms dealing for four years. If he complied, this civil penalty would be waived.
Finally, and more recently, current debates on the tension between export control
under ITAR and first amendment rights have been in the headlines. Cody Wilson,
founder of Defense Distributed made the argument that 3-D printing of guns and
disseminating the blueprints were first amendment rights. This case prompted the
fundamental question of whether the federal government can prevent someone from
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distributing knowledge. It also raises the question of just what is considered a threat to
national security. The answers to these questions are constantly debated by citizens and
lawmakers alike and export control laws and ITAR are involved in the debates.
According to The Washington Post, this is the summary of that involvement:
In April 2013, Cody Wilson, founder of Defense Distributed, printed his first fully
3-D-printed pistol, including the receiver, springs and barrel. Then he opensourced the files, posting them on an unregulated file-sharing website. At the
time, exports within the International Traffic in Arms Regulations were under the
State Department’s purview. The Justice Department worked with the State
Department throughout Wilson’s case, according to Nauert. Ultimately, DOJ
[Department of Justice] advised the federal government to settle, believing it was
likely to lose in court on First Amendment grounds (Paul, 2018).
This most recent matter once again showcased the limitations of export control in
the United States. For gun-control advocates, the idea of these 3-D printed guns—and in
a more fundamental sense, the knowledge to create these weapons—raises concerns
about the overall safety of communities domestic and abroad. For others, limiting the
production and sales of these guns is a violation of First and Second Amendment rights.
The three cases cited above: Rwanda, Benghazi, and 3-D printed guns are only
examples of many instances where the limitations of arms and export control threaten the
safety of communities around the world. Export control and its understanding and
practice ultimately needs to adapt to the demands of a multi-polar world beyond the
traditional concept of competing states. Should export control see tougher regulations and
restrictions? Based on the events above, one could arguably say “yes.” But what about
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applying these same, tougher restrictions to research and institutions of higher education?
Although some may argue that not applying the same, stronger regulations is
hypocritical, this application would require a whole set of different considerations and
questions.
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Chapter Four
The Concept of Academic Freedom in U.S. Higher Education
Since the early 1900s, academia in the United States has always, and will always
pride itself on concepts of intellectual independence, the quest for truth, and academic
freedom. To be honest, growing up in the United States and making my way through the
public-school system, and later higher education, the concept of academic freedom was
something I, and probably many others, never thought about. In the most naïve sense, it is
something we have all probably taken for granted. Philosophically speaking, any
discussion about academic freedom will involve considerations of morality and ethics.
Rebecca Eisenberg (1988) from the University of Michigan Law School attempted a
comprehensive definition of academic freedom:
The most obvious of these [values] are the related values of inquiry and
dissemination of knowledge. Academic freedom promotes the advancement of
knowledge by protecting scholarly investigation and reflection. It promotes
dissemination of knowledge by protecting scholars who convey their learning
through teaching, publication, and extramural utterances. Academic freedom also
serves the value of critical objectivity by permitting scholars to challenge received
wisdom and insulating them from pressure to adhere to a prescribed
orthodoxy…Academic freedom ensures that the enterprise of scholarship will be
left to professionals operating with minimal lay interference (p. 1367).
This concept of academic freedom and the attendant moral issues surrounding it is
important to comprehend. Not only does it place importance on the freedom of a student
to learn by promoting scholarly reflection and investigation, it also allows the professor,
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teacher, lecturer, or instructor to research and create curriculum without outside pressure
from administration, governments, or business organizations. Alexis Gibbs from the
Department of Education Studies and Liberal Arts at the University of Winchester
describes that in many developing countries (e.g. during the era of the Soviet Union),
issues of censorship, religious orthodoxy, civil conflict and political repression all proved
obstacles to an institution’s ability to sustain academic freedom and protect the pursuit of
knowledge (2016, p. 176). Controlling science and knowledge for financial, political, or
social interests of others, whether it be governments, or even authority within the own
academic institution, should ultimately be avoided. Additionally, Philip Altbach from the
Center of International Higher Education at Boston College, argued that corporate- or
government-sponsored research can also have negative implications on academic
freedom, including instances when research findings being suppressed or exaggerated for
benefits of the sponsor (2001, p. 216).
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), was founded after
World War I as a voice against the quests and questionable sacrifices for national
security. AAUP recognized the ethics of academic freedom and established the 1915
Declaration of Principles:
Faculty members can best fulfill their social function of expanding and
disseminating new knowledge if they are protected from lay interference. The lay
trustees and administrators who run universities present a particularly acute threat
because of their direct power over faculties and because their concern with the
financial aspects of university governance may lead them to be co-opted by the
interests of university patrons. Academic freedom and tenure protect faculty
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members from these powerful figures who might otherwise distort the academic
enterprise in favor of particular political or financial interests (Eisenberg, 1988,
1365-1366).

Even a couple years after the 2001 terrorist attacks and the implementation of the
Patriot Act by the Bush administration, the AAUP maintained a strong stance for
academic freedom. The statement below was published after a committee meeting on
May 9, 2003:
As war in its second year becomes the accepted routine of American life, rather
than a confused departure from the ways of peace, the decision of the American
Association of University Professors to hold fast to its fundamental principles has
been justified. The determination to save rather than to jettison what had been
won through years of courage and effort was based upon the experience of the
First World War and on the knowledge that freedoms lost are difficult to
regain. . . . Academic freedom is one facet of intellectual freedom; other aspects
of that larger concept—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of
religion—are among the avowed objects for which this war is being fought. It
would be folly to draw a boundary line across the area of freedom (as cited in
O’Neil, 2003, p. 3).

On the surface of it all, one might think national security should always be top
priority and protecting university faculty from administrators in their own institution is a
senseless or silly worry. But this protection is necessary for maintaining the validity and
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ethics of science and knowledge for all. Without this protection and without academic
freedom, students, the public, and the whole academic and scientific enterprise could not
be certain that they are receiving the facts, informed opinions, and uncompromised
knowledge from experts in the field. This quest for knowledge is essential for scientific
investigation and for understanding and enhancing every facet of the world around us.
When legislation and regulations such as the AECA and ITAR interfere in the practice of
academic freedom, students and the public cannot benefit from the “marketplace of
ideas” in the same way.
As described in the previous policy cycle examination, export control has evolved
to more permanent control on intangible concepts like technical knowledge and data for
accomplishing foreign policy and national security objectives. In addition to this policy,
academia has also evolved. Concepts of globalization and globalism are embraced and
scientific collaboration and exposure to differing global ideas, cultures, languages, and
people is fundamental to academic progress and intellectual enlightenment. Thus, having
a rich and diverse academic community with international student and scholar
participation is a common goal found throughout many, if not all universities in the
United States. Nevertheless, there seems to be a fundamental dissonance through the
evolution of these two societal institutions being discussed: The shared common quest for
national security, and the ethics of academic freedom enriched with international
scholarly collaboration.
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Academic Research under Export Control
As mentioned in the introduction, there are currently two sets of regulations in the
United States that govern not only export law, but the control of technical knowledge,
data, and sensitive research. These are the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
under the Department of Commerce. and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) under the Department of State. Although, this project mainly examines the ITAR,
there are some parts of the EAR that also impact research done in an academic setting.
Under both the ITAR and EAR, the export of technical data and knowledge is considered
a “deemed export.” A deemed export is the release of controlled technology, data,
knowledge, and information to a non-U.S. person irrespective of where the transaction
took place. James D. Templin (2009), from the John Marshall Law School, explained that
“deemed exports [can] occur quite frequently in academic research settings where foreign
nationals are able to observe controlled equipment in use or discuss controlled equipment
or technical data” (p. 554).
Due to the nature of these controversial regulations regarding the control of
technical data and knowledge to foreign nationals in an academic setting, both the ITAR
and EAR include exclusions that not only allows for research and scientific collaboration
with foreign nationals, but for the dissemination of certain research all together. These
are known as the fundamental research and the educational-information exclusions.
Templin described these exclusions:
Generally, the fundamental research exclusion applies for basic and applied
research ordinarily published within the scientific community, so long as
researchers openly conduct the research and without restrictions on publication or
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access to or dissemination of the research results. The educational-information
exclusion, or “teaching exemption,” authorizes the disclosure of educational
information released by instruction in catalog courses or general scientific,
mathematical, or engineering principles commonly taught in colleges and
universities without a license (p. 556).

While the incorporation of these export control exclusions provides some
flexibility for academic institutions to incorporate foreign nationals in research projects,
understanding what’s considered “fundamental” or “general” knowledge is vague and
complicated in answer. In addition, if a university were to engage in export-controlled
research with collaboration of foreign students or faculty, the university would have to
receive export licenses for every foreign national working on any part of the project.
These requirements of first, understanding what’s deemed as fundamental research or
knowledge, and second, going through the proper licensing procedures places barriers on
efficient and ethical scholarly investigation and collaboration. Blaine Garfolo from
Northwestern Polytechnic University, and Barbara L’Huillier and Soha Khan from Prince
Mohammad Bin Fahd University (2017) described the very problems of export control
vagueness and interpretation facing researchers in the United States:
Even the governmental bureaucracy responsible for classification, the US
Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), has
acknowledged that the international Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) law is
often extremely ambiguous. In fact, the DDTC acknowledges that contacting
multiple representatives of ITAR to dispute or get clarification of a classification
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ruling would most likely result in multiple interpretations and as such,
inconsistent answers. Herein lays the first part of the problem: the arbitrary (and
inconsistent) classification of information and technology as a National Security
concern (p. 410).

Additionally, the United States Munitions List (USML), which is regulated under
the ITAR and provides a list of prohibited exports is complicated and dense. The USML
is currently divided into twenty-one categories ranging from firearms and other weapons
to vehicles, protective personnel equipment (PPE), and everything else in between. As
David A. Broniatowski, Nicole C. Jordan, Andrew M. Long, Mattew G. Richards, and
Roland E. Weibel (2005) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology stated, “the
breadth of the USML leaves room for individual interpretations by enforcement agents
within the State Department and, hence, uncertainty in the minds of those who are
conducting research that may be related to these technologies” (p. 4).
Both the ITAR and EAR are difficult to understand when deciding who needs an
export license and what’s considered fundamental research in the context of these
regulations. While the two exemptions discussed do help relieve some of the tension
between academic freedom and national security, these regulations ultimately restrict the
flow of information to some groups of people and not others.
Figure 1 [provided by Templin, (2009, p. 576)] describes seven steps for
determining if foreign faculty and/or staff need licenses if they’re involved in controlled
research. Note the very first step: “Is the individual’s loyalty tied to a country of
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concern?” Under the ITAR § 126.1(1) and (2), licenses are denied purely on certain
country affiliations. The regulations read:
(1) For defense articles [which includes technical data, research, and knowledge]
and defense services, the following countries have a policy of denial: Belarus,
Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela. (2) For defense articles
and services, a policy of denial applies to the following countries except as
specified in the associated paragraphs below: Afghanistan, Central African
Republic, Cyprus,
Democratic
Republic of Congo,
Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya,
Somalia, South
Sudan, Sudan,
Zimbabwe (2018).
Under the
interpretation of this
policy, scholars and
students from any of
the above countries
mentioned are
automatically denied
Figure 1

access solely based
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on their origin and citizenship, all of which are not controlled by the individual. This
concept brings us back to our “So what?” question: what is the ethicality of these
protectionist and nationalistic policies that restrict knowledge from some people and not
others? Do they have greater rights to access knowledge? Some may say these measures
are necessary for our national security and foreign policy objectives, while others
understand academic freedom and scholarly investigation for all as fundamental for the
pursuit of knowledge and truth. Nevertheless, government policies such as these deemed
export controls against academic freedom are in constant debate and question the very
concept of science and democracy altogether. “If science [and scholarly investigation]
was indeed the support column of liberal democracy, the erosion of the first threatened
the destruction of the second. If science yields fruit only when curiosity is given free
reign, then academic freedom, in an absolute sense, is an ally of democracy even when
[it] inadvertently poses threats to the integrity of the state” (Evans & Valdivia, 2012, p.
173-174).
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Chapter Five
Eastern Washington University’s Research Potential and Export Control Review
Eastern Washington University (EWU) is a regional public university located on
the eastern side of Washington state in the United States. It has come a long way since its
humble beginnings in 1882 as the Benjamin P. Cheney Academy, a small school of once
about 200 students. Following World War II, the institution grew rapidly in response to
the inland northwest’s growing demand for professionals, and in turn added a wide range
of undergraduate and graduate degrees (Eastern Washington University, About, n.d.).
Today, EWU has over 12,000 students with almost 150 areas of study.
EWU would need to contemplate three primary criteria before engaging in export
control related practices: (1) the international student, scholar, and faculty population
(since export control applies mainly to non-U.S.-persons), (2) the strength in STEM
programming (as these are common areas of study for controlled research under the
USML), and finally (3) the overall strength of the institution’s research capacity and the
direction the institution is headed. Currently, EWU is experiencing growth in all three of
these areas and is positioning itself for a change in direction.
Of the 12,000 students at EWU, about four-percent are international
undergraduates, with Saudi Arabia, China, and Vietnam drawing the highest enrollments
for academic year 2017-2018 (Eastern Washington University, 2017-2018). Although the
international student population is considered somewhat low at only four-percent, EWU
is continually seeking to expand its global outreach and increase its number of
international students, scholars, and faculty. Just recently, EWU was the recipient of the
2018 Higher Education Excellence in Diversity (HEED) Award. This national award
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recognizes colleges and universities that demonstrate an outstanding commitment to
diversity and inclusion (Meany, 2018b). In addition, EWU has seen a steady increase of
international undergraduate students from 230 in 2011 to 434 in 2016, with most of these
students being from NEA (Near East Asia), and EAP (East Asia Pacific) (Eastern
Washington University, Reports and demographics, n.d.). International graduate student
numbers on the other hand, are experiencing a different trend. This is discussed in the
next chapter.
EWU also continues to see its science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) programs increase in student demand and strength in the region. The
Washington state legislature designated $67 million dollars in 2018 to a long-awaited
Interdisciplinary Science Building (ISC) on Eastern’s campus, reflecting the state-,
region-, and campus-wide commitment to STEM curriculum and research. According to
EWU administrators, “the project calls for a state-of-the-art science building that will
meet the modern day needs of growing STEM programs such as biology,
chemistry/biochemistry, geology, and physics” (Meany, 2018a).
Eastern Washington University is concurrently on a STEM roll, even as it
increases its focus and draw from international quarters. Even with these positive
developments, the institution itself must have clear direction of where it is, where it is
going, and how it will get there. For EWU, the 2018-2023 strategic plan includes four
primary goals: ignite change, embrace equity and social justice, drive innovation, and
transform the region. Although all different in their own respects, these four goals
prioritize student success and excellence in teaching, scholarship, and research. In
recognizing what could potentially lead to future export control related considerations
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and engagement, I identified a few points described under the “indicators of success”
within the strategic plan. Most of these were found under the tiers of igniting change,
driving innovation, and transforming the region. The identified points are listed below:
Igniting change:
•

Develop a Center for Applied Research and Economic Development that
brings together faculty, students, and staff to assist businesses and
organizations with high-impact research and consulting services to provide
innovative solutions to tomorrow’s problems.

Driving Innovation:
•

Invest in faculty and staff, providing tools and opportunities to promote
collaboration and excellence in teaching, scholarship, research, and
creative activity.

Transforming the Regions:
•

Develop curricula directly tied to regional trends and needs, as we partner
with employers.

•

Ensure that every student develops an academic identity that connects to
meaningful career-related experiences and professional development
activities.

•

Build partnerships with employers to provide paid student internships and
other practical experiences.

•

Foster opportunities for graduate and undergraduate research that respond
to regional priorities (Eastern Washington University, Institutional
Strategic Plan 2018-2023, n.d.).
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Notice how all these points either address the importance of scholarship and
research, student success, and/or building of partnerships with employers and
communities. While Eastern Washington University is not currently involved in
conducting sensitive, export-controlled related research, it has great potential to expand
in that direction with its increasing strength in STEM programming, international student
and faculty participation, a strategic plan that prioritizes research and excellence in
learning, and the campus’ close-proximity to Fairchild Airforce Base (less than 12 miles
from the main Cheney Campus). In addition, many defense contractors such as Boeing,
Raytheon, Hewlett-Packard, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are major
employers and where many students and university staff may find future employment.
Students are tomorrow’s leaders. Their ideas and innovations can help solve some of our
societies’ most challenging problems. Their academic and life work can include profound
breakthroughs and inventions for the improvement and betterment of humanity. To
propel Eastern Washington University to the forefront of all this, the institution needs to
recognize and capitalize on the research potential and partnership opportunities it has.
These conditions along with the institution’s 2018-2023 strategic plan, requires not only
great consideration, but caution if engaging in export-controlled practices is included in
the design, directly or indirectly. If engagement does occur, it is extremely easy for
export violations to arise out of institutional inexperience, lack of awareness, and lack of
faculty and staff training. The moral and ethical values of academic freedom also risk
being lost without appropriate preventative measures in place. Eastern Washington
University published its “Faculty Values Statement” in 2004 after a challenge to
academic freedom alerted faculty to the potential administrative overreach. Below are
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five of the ten “values” listed that are relevant to this study, with “academic freedom” in
the first position:
Academic freedom: Faculty members should enjoy the right to express views,
teach, and conduct research without fear of retribution or censure.
Diversity of students, faculty, and administrators: A rich variety of experiences,
perspectives, and talents is essential to our strength as a university community.
Scholarship and the arts: Eastern Washington University faculty should be
supported in achieving excellence in their disciplines at the local, regional, and
national levels and in publicizing those accomplishments; the university and its
reputation benefit greatly from such achievements.
Community Service: Eastern Washington University should engage in activities
to ameliorate social problems, provide assistance to K-12 teachers, and furnish
other services contributing to the welfare of the region, the nation, and the world.
Ethical Conduct: Underlying each of the above values is a belief in fostering
ethical behavior in our students and modeling it in our own speech and actions
(Eastern Washington University, 2004).

As the listing of values indicates, faculty at EWU could be placed in a difficult
position, where certain values are pitted against others, if they engage in export control
related practices without appropriate training and deliberation.
Currently, EWU has a relatively rudimentary export control policy published on
its website. The policy EWUG 201-10: Export Control states:
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It is the policy of Eastern Washington University (EWU) to fully comply with all
applicable federal statutes, executive orders, regulations, and contractual
requirements for the safeguarding of controlled technical information in its
possession. This includes full and total compliance with export controls and the
transfer of controlled technology. Under no circumstances shall employees or
other persons acting on behalf of EWU engage in activities in contravention of
U.S. export control regulations. Questions regarding the applicability of export
control laws should be directed to the President’s Office. While the vast majority
of teaching, research, and travel conducted by EWU faculty and employees will
fall within one or more of the exceptions to the export control laws, export
controls may affect EWU faculty and staff in the following situations:
• Traveling abroad
• Sharing science or technology-based research information with persons
who are not citizens of the United States or permanent resident aliens, or
• Entering into a contract, including a grant, related to science or
technology (Eastern Washington University, 2016, para 2)
Notice that EWU states that “under no circumstances shall employees or other
persons acting on behalf of EWU engage in activities in contravention of U.S. export
control regulations.” In addition, they also mention that although rare, export controls
may affect EWU faculty in the above bulleted situations. Based on this stated policy, the
university may not be involved in export-controlled practices directly, but it’s clear that
this opportunity may arise, and faculty are not necessarily restricted from participating. In
this case, policy can easily become practice, and practice can introduce compliance risks.
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Further down the policy document is a brief description of federal compliance. This
section reads:
To comply with federal export control regulations, the University must obtain
permission from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of
Commerce, or the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control before traveling or engaging in any other activity that may be export
controlled (Eastern Washington University, 2016, para 3).
Finally, at the bottom of this policy, EWU states that they are “committed to educating its
faculty and staff regarding the export control requirements” (Eastern Washington
University, 2016, para 4). Yet, upon further investigation, there were no resources or
trainings located, or at least easily accessible. Other universities in the surrounding area
however, had more detailed export control policy websites with links to more information
and trainings. These universities include the University of Washington, Western
Washington University, Washington State University, University of Oregon, Oregon
State, University of Idaho, University of Montana, and Montana State (see the reference
pages for these websites). Without proper training and knowledge of export control
regulations at EWU, violations can easily occur. These violations ultimately have the
potential to lead to intellectual property theft and serious penalties such as hefty fines,
imprisonment, and/or exclusion of from future export control activities.
Whether or not to engage in ITAR or export control related activities in an
academic setting needs to be considered from a regulation standpoint, and from a moral
and ethical perspective, one that upholds the values of academic freedom, the pursuit of
knowledge and truth, and the critical questioning of policies that restrict information from
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some groups of people and not others. Before this engagement can take place however, a
larger, open discussion and consideration is needed by the university-community at large.
At this moment, the regulations exist; engaging in export control related practices without
being fully aware can lead to serious criminal penalties and greater ethical dilemmas in
higher education. With all this in mind, the next chapter provides suggestions for Eastern
Washington University to begin the initial discussion and necessary considerations of
engaging in export-control related practices.
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Chapter Six
Recommendations, Considerations, and Conclusion
Export control and the implementing regulations of the ITAR and EAR have
evolved through domestic and international events and with the United States’
everchanging security concern. Today, the national security and foreign policy concerns
that were seminal to the implementation of export control laws are different and more
complex than they once were. With this change and the phenomenon of globalization and
globalism impacting all facets of life, the security risk associated with the control of
sensitive information, research, and knowledge, is complicated, undefined, and morally
and ethically challenging.
In an academic research setting, Broniatowski et al. (2005) describe that higher
education institutions can react to export control regulations and the uncertainty of
potential security risks in one of two ways:
A precautionary stance to national security is one in which a decision maker
deems a potential, but as yet unrealized, risk as important and responds by using
restrictions and controls to mitigate any chance of future risk…[and/or] a
reactionary stance, or a “proof-before-action” policy. The basis of a reactionary
stance is that present threats should be eliminated if they exist; however, there
must be proof of the existence of future threats before regulations or restrictions
are developed (p. 2).

The authors also state that in general, most academic institutions take on a more
reactionary stance to export control whereas the United States government is more
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precautionary in nature (p. 2). These differing approaches toward risk has not only led to
a fundamental dissonance between the academic community and those in the military,
enforcement, and intelligence sectors, but a strict governmental precautionary stance may
have also impacted the overall foreign student enrollment in the United States.
[A decline in foreign student enrollment] may be associated with more stringent
student visa restrictions and with regulatory restrictions, such as those given in
ITAR, specifying on which projects foreign nationals can work once they do
arrive. Rather than attending schools in the U.S., foreign nationals are opting to
study in other foreign countries or in their home countries (Broniatowski et al.,
2005, p. 6)

Although Eastern Washington University itself has seen a steady increase in
foreign undergraduate students since 2011 (as stated in the last chapter), the foreign
graduate student rate has been declining since 2013. At its highest, EWU had 79
international graduate students in 2013, and more recently, only 16 in 2016 (Eastern
Washington University, Reports and demographics, n.d.). In deciding which stance
Eastern Washington University should take regarding export-control related practices, the
indirect and direct consequences of engaging in this type of research must be considered.
A thorough review and discussion among the academic community of the institution’s
strategic plan, the international student participation, the strength of STEM programming,
and the current export control policy must be conducted before engaging in these
practices. Based on this research project and my initial findings and review, a few
suggestions and considerations come to mind.
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It’s clear that EWU’s strategic plan emphasizes student success, excellence in
teaching and research, and building partnerships with employers and communities. This
plan is very detailed with set goals and specific objectives to achieve those goals.
However, I would also say that the current EWU export control policy lacks sufficient
information regarding not only export control regulations, but also the ethical
considerations of academic freedom in conducting controlled research. This can lead to
serious criminal penalties and ethical dilemmas in higher education that will ultimately
run against the university’s strategic plan. Specifically, potential conflict exists between
the points of (1) driving innovation that invests in faculty and staff while providing the
tools to promote excellence in teaching, scholarship, and research, and (2) transforming
the region by ensuring every student develops their own academic identity.
I recommend that EWU take both a reactionary and precautionary approach
towards export control. To strengthen its already-in-place reactionary stance (the current
EWU export control policy), EWU should consider providing better understanding and
more comprehensive training to the staff and faculty regarding export control, the
regulations, and national security threats. This will help in identifying and eliminating
present threats and/or concerns with credible proof. In addition, EWU should take a more
precautionary stance in maintaining and upholding the morals and ethics of knowledge
and academic freedom in higher education. This will help mitigate the potential risks of
losing the fundamental values of U.S. higher education that export control ultimately
threatens. Both proposed reactionary and precautionary approaches can be achieved by
implementing a comprehensive export control compliance program that not only focuses
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on following the regulations but teaches faculty and staff the ethical considerations and
consequences of engaging in export-control related practices.
In order to implement an effective export control compliance program within the
university, the academic community and leadership may conduct a SWOT analysis to
brainstorm ideas, organize information, decide on a system that is most effective, and
reveal the possibilities and limitations for implementing a university compliance
program. In addition, organizations such as the Society for International Affairs (SIA)
and ASIS International can provide resources, information, and guidance on export
control compliance. Finally, John McHale (2009) from Military & Aerospace Electronics
cites Kay Georgi, an export compliance lawyer at Arent Fox LLP in Washington D.C.
who suggests eleven important steps for how to construct an export compliance program.
The steps are summarized as follows:
1. Have management or leadership issue a policy indicating the importance
of export control compliance and the consequences of non-compliance.
2. Establish a human reporting structure (who will handle what aspects of
compliance).
3. Register and maintain registration with the Department of State.
4. Establish a system to classify all known products, services, and practices.
5. Set up a system for ensuring practices subject to export control cannot be
conducted without a license.
6. Establish a system for identifying export-controlled research, data, and
knowledge and a plan for controlling hard copy information and soft
copies on computers, LANs, e-mails, etc.
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7. Involve the appropriate department (human resources, office of research
and grants, office of global initiatives, etc.) to ensure licenses are obtained
for foreign nationals.
8. Involve procurement to ensure export-controlled articles are not procured
abroad without the appropriate licenses.
9. Establish record-keeping practices and reporting procedures.
10. Provide comprehensive training to all faculty and staff on all the above
systems and export control compliance.
11. Audit all the above systems (p. 17)

Of course, all these steps can be tailored and adapted to fit the needs and
processes of Eastern Washington University. Nevertheless, these steps show the
significant amount of planning, development, and work required to implement a proper
export compliance program. In addition—and for our case—I would add the faculty and
staff training should be prioritized. Based on the findings of this research project, this
training must include a full understanding on not only the importance of export control
compliance, but a thorough review of the ethical considerations of engaging in these
practices. In addition, many of the surrounding institutions’ websites (previously listed
above) include resources for faculty and staff training on export control regulations and
rules. However, many are lacking in terms of teaching and communicating the ethical
considerations of these practices.
With this in place, Eastern Washington University can establish a system that is
both compliant with the current export control regulations of the ITAR and EAR, and
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proactive relative to protecting their expressed faculty values. As technology and related
knowledge evolves to become ever more powerful, and government regulations become
increasingly stringent and entangled, we need to establish a civic and moral compass that
will allow people to use this technology ethically while maintaining due regard for the
educational wellbeing and development of others. Once these criteria are met, Eastern
Washington University can truly help ignite change, drive innovation, and transform the
region through innovative, significant, and global-relevant research.
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